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ABSTRACT
Beginning in the late 1980s, American corporations began increasingly linking the compensation of
central research personnel to the economic objectives of the corporation. This paper examines the
impact of the shifting compensation of the heads of corporate research and development. Among
firms with centralized R&D organizations, a clear relationship emerges: more long-term incentives
(e.g. stock options and restricted stock) are associated with more heavily cited patents. These
incentives also appear to be somewhat associated with more patent filings and patents of greater
generality. We address endogeniety concerns in a variety of ways, including examining the impact
of compensation for other key managers and utilizing an instrument based on spawning activity in
the region. While we cannot determine whether the effect is due to better project selection or better
people selection, the results continue to be consistent with our interpretation that performance pay
of corporate R&D heads is associated with more innovative firms.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Research and development expenditures have long been understood to be a key 
driver of economic growth. Yet profound changes in the U.S. corporate R&D sector over 
the past two decades have attracted remarkably little attention by economists. This paper 
seeks to address this gap, by seeking to understand whether the increasingly high-
powered incentives of central corporate research leaders are related to the innovation 
process. 
The central corporate R&D laboratory was a dominant feature of the innovation 
landscape in the U.S. for most of the 20
th century. While the concept of the centralized 
laboratory originated in the German chemical industry, U.S. corporations adopted it with 
enthusiasm by mid century. These campus-like facilities employed many thousands of 
researchers, many of whom were free to pursue fundamental science with little direct 
commercial applicability, most notably Bell Laboratories (with 11 Nobel Laureates) and 
IBM Central Research (with 5). 
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, American corporations began 
fundamentally rethinking the role of these centralized research facilities (see, for 
example, the discussions in Rosenbloom and Spencer [1996]). Reflecting both a 
perception of disappointing commercial returns and intensified competitive pressures, 
firms undertook a variety of changes to these facilities. These included both paring the 
size of central research facilities in favor of divisional laboratories and more tightly 
linking the compensation of central research personnel to the economic objectives of the 
corporation.
1  
                                                 
1These changes were frequently dramatic in magnitude.  For instance, the head count of Bell Laboratories 
(now operated by Lucent Technologies) dropped from 35,000 in 1997 to 9,500 in 2005. Microsoft’s $8   3 
Numerous observers within the scientific establishment have expressed concern 
about the long-run implications of these changes.  For instance, the National Science 
Board in 1992 attributed the decline of centralized research facilities to “risk 
minimization” on the part of corporations and an inappropriate emphasis on “the needs of 
today’s customers” instead of longer-run objectives. Concerns about these patterns have 
frequently been expressed as well by organizations such as the National Academies of 
Science and the Council on Competitiveness. 
To economists, however, the issue is not so clear-cut.  On the one hand, observers 
such as Jensen [1993] have contrasted the incentives within corporate research facilities 
unfavorably with those offered by venture capitalists.  He suggests that had higher-
powered incentives been offered, some of the poor performance of research-intensive 
firms would have been avoided. In a similar vein, Kortum and Lerner [2000] find that 
venture-backed firms are approximately three times as efficient in generating innovations 
as corporate research. 
On the other hand, the addition of high-powered incentives could plausibly have 
deleterious consequences as well. A critical problem, highlighted by the line of work 
beginning with Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], is “multi-tasking.” In particular, when 
an agent has multiple tasks to perform, only some of which can be measured with 
precision, it may make sense to offer compensation schemes with flat or very limited 
sensitivity to performance. Otherwise, the agent may neglect the activities that cannot be 
precisely measured. 
                                                                                                                                                 
billion in R&D expenditures in 2003 included $1.3 billion in equity 
(http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/nov04/1104rd.html, accessed March 12, 2005). 
     4 
Scientists and engineers in research facilities are likely to have a portfolio of 
projects that they can work on, with varying degree of observability.  As the incentives 
offered by the corporation increase, researchers may be led to spurn riskier but important 
long-run projects in favor of straightforward efforts (Holmstrom [1989]).  As a result, it 
may make sense to offer weaker incentives in these settings (see also Lazear [1989]).   
Moreover, the effect of different types of performance pay may not be uniform.  
In particular, a series of papers have suggested that compensation in the form of option 
holdings will lead managers to riskier behavior, because the increased volatility of the 
firm will translate into option value. Meanwhile, risk-averse managers who receive 
extensive stock-based compensation and whose human and financial capital is poorly 
diversified will prefer that their firms make less risky choices. Examples of literature 
where this idea has been developed are Smith and Stulz [1985], Hirshleifer and Suh 
[1992], and many others. 
This question is also related to research on the relationship between authority and 
incentives in uncertain environments. Recent work suggests that for complex jobs it may 
be optimal to delegate decision-making to better informed agents and keep them in check 
with high-powered incentives (Prendergast [2002]).  Also, firms may link pay to global 
or firm performance measures for specific positions in order to encourage better decisions 
over project selection that have firm-wide implications (Athey and Roberts [2001]). 
While the position of corporate R&D head varies across firms, the responsibilities can be 
generally characterized as making decisions about research project selection in highly 
uncertain environments.   5 
This paper examines the relationship between innovation and the shifting 
compensation of the managers responsible for corporate research and development.  We 
find that the compensation of corporate R&D heads changed dramatically over the course 
of the 1990s, with much greater use of long-term incentives (e.g., restricted stock and 
stock options).  The ratio of the value of long-term incentives to cash compensation for 
corporate R&D heads has more than doubled over the period from 1988 to 1998 from 
0.39 to 0.87.  The value of long-term incentives (in 1996 $) has more than tripled over the 
period from $136,867 to $416,720. These shifts are not unique to these managers, 
mirroring those in other senior managers’ compensation.
2 
We then turn to understanding the relationship between these changes and shifts 
in innovation.  We are unable to find consistent patterns among firms with a 
decentralized R&D organization. But, among firms with a centralized R&D organization 
in which the corporate R&D head has greater firm-wide authority over R&D decisions, a 
clear relationship emerges: more long-term incentives are associated with more heavily 
cited patents. These incentives also appear to be associated with patents of greater 
generality and more frequent awards. There is little evidence that high-powered 
incentives lead to the neglect of more tangential research or to a substitution of patents 
for publications in scientific journals: greater incentives generally are not associated with 
any drop-off in the volume of scientific publication. 
Finally, we examine the question of whether there is a causal relationship between 
the innovation measures and the long-term incentives of corporate R&D heads: 
specifically, whether we find support for the hypothesis that long-term incentives lead to 
                                                 
2Hall and Liebman [1998], Murphy [1999], and others document the significant increase in CEO long-term 
incentives over a similar time-frame.     6 
either better R&D decisions or more skilled R&D managers and, in turn, more-heavily 
cited patents. While the very presence of an association may be of interest, understanding 
causation is also important.  
While we must be careful in the interpretation, we present three analyses that 
support the incentives interpretation of the result. First, we examine the relationship using 
two other corporate managers who are unlikely to be directly involved in the innovation 
process: the chief financial officer (CFO) and the human resources head (HRH). If we 
find a relationship between patent quality and compensation of these officials, it is 
unlikely that the incentives story holds. We find no relationship between patent quality 
and generality and the incentives offered to the CFO or the HRH. 
Second, we undertake an instrumental variables analysis. We employ an 
instrument that we believe will be correlated with the likelihood of high-powered 
incentives but uncorrelated with the technological prospects of the firm: the extent to 
which there is spawning, or the creation of entrepreneurial venture-backed entities by 
managers of publicly traded companies, in the county of the firm’s headquarters and the 
year of the observation. In places and periods where there are many departures to venture 
backed firms, firms should be under more pressure to offer high-powered compensation. 
High-powered compensation continues to be associated with more heavily cited patents. 
Finally, using the methodology of Aggarwal and Samwick [1999], we show that 
the sensitivity of compensation to performance is positively related to performance, but 
declines with the volatility of performance. The negative risk-incentive relationship holds 
in firms with a centralized R&D organization and R&D-intensive firms, which are   7 
precisely the firms where we anticipate that corporate R&D decisions will have the 
greatest effect on firm value, but not elsewhere.   
Several caveats are in order.  First, while we document that stronger incentives 
are associated with more innovations, we cannot distinguish between whether the effect 
of performance pay is due to better project selection or better people selection. While it 
would be interesting to disentangle these, both explanations are consistent with 
performance pay: firms should hire better people to produce higher-quality patents and 
pay them more in return.  Incentive pay plans are supposed to have selection effects, in 
addition to direct incentive effects [Lazear, 2000].
3  
Second, in equilibrium, firms should offer the optimal level of incentives.
 During 
the period under study, competitive pressures have led to a greater importance of 
innovation giving skilled R&D managers more bargaining power.  Also, the effectiveness 
of property rights over inventions has changed significantly during the late 1980s and 
1990s. As Merges [1999] notes in the context of R&D: “The history of intra-firm R&D 
management is a history of experimentation to find the right set of incentives.”
4   
This paper is related to two sets of work.  First, a number of articles, particularly 
in the accounting literature, have sought to relate R&D choices to the incentives of top 
management.  Three pieces deserve special mention.  Dechow and Sloan [1991] 
examines R&D expenditures of firms with chief executive officers (CEOs) in their final 
years of office, to determine whether they cut spending to improve short-term earnings 
                                                 
3 We thank Kathryn Shaw for highlighting this distinction.   
4Demsetz and Lehn [1985] argue that if all firms in the sample are optimizing with respect to long-term 
incentives, we should not find any relation between performance and the observed endogenous choice, 
once the exogenous determinants of choice are controlled for.  However, as discussed in Ittner, Lambert, 
and Larcker [2003], Milgrom and Roberts [1992] argue that firms adapt by experimentation and imitation, 
and, at any given time, not all firms in the cross-section will have adopted optimal organizational practices.     8 
performance. They find that these firms spend less on R&D during the CEOs’ final years, 
unless the CEO has significant equity holdings in the firm. Holthausen, Larcker, and 
Sloan [1995] examine whether the compensation for the divisional CEO is related to 
subsequent innovative activity within the division. They find at least weak evidence that 
when divisional CEOs have a higher proportion of total compensation tied to long-term 
components, the ratio of patent awards to sales in the division is higher. Finally, Eng and 
Shackell [2001] find no evidence that the adoption of long-term performance plans for 
senior management has implications for R&D spending, once the presence of holdings by 
institutional investors are controlled for. Because the compensation of officials directly 
responsible for managing R&D are typically not included in filings with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, these works focus on the compensation of senior 
managers (Holthausen, et al., being an exception).  
The second, smaller body of work more explicitly seeks to relate the 
organizational structure of R&D to innovation.  Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern [1999] 
examine the intensity of research workers'  incentives for the distinct tasks of basic and 
applied research. Motivated by the multi-tasking framework, they suggest that when 
incentives are strong along one dimension, firms will set high-powered incentives for 
effort along other dimensions that compete for the worker' s effort and attention. They 
find that firms who promote individuals based on scientific publications (which are likely 
to reflect basic research) also provide more intense incentives for success in applied 
research, by increasing program budgets in response to patent filings. Argyres and 
Silverman [2004] examine how the centralization of a firm’s R&D organizational 
structure and R&D funding authority affects its innovations. They find that in particular,   9 
firms with centralized R&D organizations generate innovations that are more cited, and 
are cited across a broader range of technological areas, than do firms with decentralized 
R&D organizations.
5 
The contribution of this paper is to document a new set of facts that performance 
pay is positively associated with firm innovation. To our knowledge, this relationship has 
not been documented elsewhere. The facts documented in the paper constitute suggestive 
evidence that stronger incentives lead to more innovation.   
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the data employed in the 
study.  In Section 3, we present the key regression analyses and robustness tests.  The 
final section concludes the paper. 
 
2.    Data Description 
2.1    Compensation Data 
The primary dataset from which we draw our sample is an unbalanced panel of 
more than 300 publicly traded U.S. firms over the years 1987 to 1998, spanning a number 
of industries. This has a rich array of compensation data for senior and middle corporate 
management. 
The data are collected from a confidential compensation survey conducted by 
Hewitt Associates, a leading human resources consulting firm specializing in executive 
compensation and benefits.  The survey is the largest private compensation survey (as 
measured by the number of participating firms).  The survey participants are typically the 
                                                 
5This paper is also related to Guedj and Scharfstein [2004], who compare 235 cancer drugs developed by 
early-stage biotechnology companies and established pharmaceutical corporations. They find that early-
stage firms are much more likely to advance drugs from Phase I to Phase II of clinical trials, but that these 
drugs are much less likely to reach later stages of trials or to be approved. This pattern is particularly 
pronounced in biotechnology companies with large cash reserves.  They attribute this pattern to agency 
problems between managers of single-product firms and their investors.   10 
leaders in their sectors.  More than 75% of the firms in the dataset are listed as Fortune 
500 firms in at least one year and more than 85% are listed as Fortune 1000 firms.
  In 
general, Hewitt survey participants also participate in other compensation consulting firm 
surveys (e.g., Hay Associates, Mercer, Towers Perrin, to name a few) and do so primarily 
to receive information about pay practices to use as a competitive benchmark in 
evaluating their own compensation programs.  It is important to note that the sample 
includes many more firms than Hewitt’s consulting client base, with at least 50% of the 
survey participants having no other relationship to Hewitt.  Based on several analyses 
described in Appendix A, we conclude that the survey sample is probably most 
representative of Fortune 500 firms.      
The survey is comprehensive in that it collects detailed compensation data on 
many senior and middle management positions, including both operational positions 
(e.g., chief operations officer and divisional CEO) and staff positions (e.g., chief financial 
officer and human resources head).  The survey typically covers all the positions at the 
top of the hierarchy and a sample of positions lower down.
6 
The data for each position include all components of compensation including 
salary, bonus, restricted stock, stock options, and other forms of long-term incentives 
(e.g., performance units). An observation in the dataset is a managerial position within a 
firm in a year.
  To ensure consistency in matching these positions across firms, the survey 
provides benchmark position descriptions and collects additional data for each position, 
leading to a rich dataset. Hence, in addition to data on all aspects of compensation, the 
dataset includes position-specific characteristics such as job title, the title of the position 
                                                 
6The Hewitt database is thus far more comprehensive than the SEC filings which form the basis for the 
ExecuComp database. Because firms are required to only file information on the top five executive officers, 
information on R&D executives is rarely included in these sources.    11 
that the job reports to (i.e., the position’s boss), number of positions between the position 
and the CEO in the organizational hierarchy, and both the incumbent’s status as a 
corporate officer and tenure in position.  
In this paper, we focus on the subset of firms (a) that report compensation data for 
the most senior executive responsible for corporate level R&D in the Hewitt survey 
(corporate R&D head) and (b) that report R&D expenditures in Compustat.  This leads to 
a sample of approximately 800 firm-years and 140 firms.  In some cases, the firms also 
have divisional R&D managers.  As a basis of comparison, we also document 
compensation for the CEO, CFO, and HRH positions. The definitions for each of these 
positions, and additional R&D positions included in the survey, are described in 
Appendix B. 
  We believe the survey data are accurate for several reasons. First, Hewitt 
personnel are knowledgeable about survey participants because they are assigned to 
specific participants for several years.  Furthermore, while the participating firms initially 
match their positions to the benchmark positions in the survey, Hewitt personnel follow 
up to verify accuracy and spend additional eight to ten hours on each questionnaire, 
evaluating the consistency of responses with public data (e.g., proxy statements) and 
across years.  Finally, participants have an incentive to match positions correctly and 
provide accurate data because they use the survey results to set pay levels and design 
management compensation programs. 
The above data are supplemented with information from Compustat for financial 
data and CRSP for shareholder returns.  While the Hewitt survey is conducted in April of 
each year and the compensation data describe the firm in the year of survey completion,   12 
some statistics (e.g., number of employees in the firm) represent the end of the most 
recent fiscal year.  To maintain consistency, we match Compustat and CRSP data using 
the year prior to the year of the survey.   
In Panel A of Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample.  
While the dataset includes 141 firms, the exact number varies over the period, as firms 
enter and exit as survey participants.  The firms in the sample are large firms with 
average sales of approximately $11.0 billion, assets of $12.1 billion, and a ratio of R&D 
expense to sales of 5%.  In 63% of the firm-years, the firm has a centralized R&D 
organization (i.e., reports a corporate R&D head and does not report divisional R&D 
managers).  In 48% of the firm-years, the corporate R&D head reports directly to the 
CEO in the organizational hierarchy.  Finally, the sample firms span many industrial 
sectors of the economy, with some concentration in the chemical, machinery, 
transportation equipment, paper, electrical, and instrumentation industries (Table 1, Panel 
B).  
A natural question is whether the individuals recorded as corporate R&D heads 
are indeed the key decision-makers, or rather outward-looking officials primarily 
responsible for being the R&D organizations’ “public face.” While it is difficult to 
answer this question definitively, we can examine these individuals’ titles. The ten most 
frequently represented titles are reported in Panel C of Table 1. These titles seem 
consistent with individuals who are involved with the day-to-day management of the 
firms’ research efforts. 
 
2.2. Innovation Data     13 
The survey data for firms reporting a corporate R&D head are linked to patent 
data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and publication data from 
Thomson/ISI’s Web of Science.   
For patent data, we employ the NBER Patent Citations Database, which includes 
all patent awards and patent citations between 1975 and 1999. For each patent awarded to 
a publicly traded firm and its affiliates, the database includes the firm’s CUSIP. We 
match the CUSIPs of the firms in Hewitt sample to those employed in the Citations 
Database.  One complication is posed by firms that went public after 1989 that are 
included in the Hewitt database, as the CUSIPs for these firms are not included in the 
NBER database.  In these instances, we add the CUSIP to the patents awarded to the firm 
and any subsidiaries in the NBER database. 
From the NBER database, we collect the following information: 
·  The number of awards to the firm in a given year. 
·  The mean and median number of citations to the firm’s patents awarded in a given 
year. 
·  The mean and median number of adjusted citations to the firm’s patents awarded 
in a given year: that is, the number of citations adjusted by the expected number 
of citations that we would anticipate that the firms’ patents would receive. We 
undertake this adjustment by estimating a regression using all patents awarded 
over this period, with controls for the year of the award, the technology subclass 
(see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] for a description), and a dummy 
indicating the patentee is a domestic entity.
7 
                                                 
7We employ the subclasses in the NBER scheme rather than U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent 
Classification scheme due to the limitations of the latter scheme, which does not correspond well to   14 
·  The “generality” of the firm’s awards in a given year. This frequently employed 
measure (see Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002]) is one minus the Herfindahl Index 
across technology classes of the patent citations received by a patent. Thus, a 
patent with a generality score approaching zero suggests that the patent has very 
narrow use, while a measure of one suggests that a diverse array of subsequent 
patents draw upon the award. We compute the mean of the generality measure for 
all patents awarded each firm in every year. 
·  The “originality” of the firm’s awards in a given year. This measure is computed 
similarly, but captures the concentration of the citations made by the patent to 
earlier awards. Once again, we average the patents awarded in each firm-year.  
·  The extent of concentration of the firm’s awards in a given year.  We compute the 
Herfindahl Index of the firm’s awards, again employing the technology subclasses 
in the NBER Patent Citations Database. 
While our primary focus is on patented technologies, we also wish to understand 
the changes in publications. We determine the number of publications by authors 
associated with each firm through the use of the Web of Science database.  We use as 
keywords the names of the firms in the Hewitt database and their major subsidiaries.
8 
One challenging issue has to do with the timing of awards and R&D expenditures. 
The economics literature has argued that patent applications are generated nearly 
contemporaneously with R&D expenditures (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman [1986]). 
Thus, it would be clearly problematic to relate the number of patent awards in 1995 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
technological classifications (see Lerner [1994] for a discussion). Foreign patentees may be cited less, as 
often their original patent filing in another nation is cited instead of the award in the United States. 
8Our search procedure did not allow us to identify citations to these articles akin to those of patents. While 
Thomson offered to sell us the citation data, the cost would have been in the six figures.   15 
compensation levels in 1995, as the patents would have been filed on average two years 
before (the typical patent took approximately two years to issue over this period
9). 
Instead, we employ in our base specifications a two-year lag for patents, relating patents 
awarded in 1995 to compensation levels in 1993. Similarly, reflecting the relatively short 
pendencies at most applied science and engineering journals (Adams, Clemmons, and 
Stephan [2004]), we relate publications appearing in 1995 to compensation levels in 
1994. 
It might be wondered why we do not instead employ applications: for instance, 
relating applications filed in 1995 to compensation levels in that year. Our reluctance to 
do so reflects the facts that (a) the extent of patent pendency is not random and (b) the 
substantial truncation bias affecting the sample. Johnson and Popp [2003] show that more 
important patents appear to take longer to issue, with a significant tail of patents taking 
10 years or more.
10  Since our compensation data begins in 1988, this would mean that 
the count of applications in a significant number of years (certainly, at least half the 
sample) would be truncated. Moreover, some of the most important patents would not be 
included in the tabulations of mean citations and other measures. If we could be assured 
that this pattern would introduce no systematic bias, we could perhaps ignore it, but it is 
hard to be confident. While the use of awards will introduce noise into the analysis (some 
awards will actually have been applied for less than two years before, while others will 
have been done so three or more years earlier), the approach should not raise concerns 
about systematic biases.  
                                                 
9For instance, Popp, Juhl, and Johnson [2004] find that the median patent awarded between 1976 and 1996 
took 23 months to issue.   
10Until the end of the period under study, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office only published issued 
patents. The fact that a firm had made a patent application that had not issued was not disclosed.     16 
Below, we will examine the robustness of the analysis to different approaches.  
For instance, rather than employing a two-year lag between patent awards and 
compensation data, we employ a one- and three-year lag.  Similarly, we employ the 
application data despite our reservations with it. The critical results continue to hold as 
before.  
As noted above, the NBER Patent database includes all awards and citations 
through the end of 1999.  Thus, in our regressions, we will be only employing data on 
compensation levels between 1988 and 1997.
11  
 
2.3.    Summary Statistics 
This study primarily focuses on compensation for the most senior executive with 
corporate R&D responsibility (i.e., corporate R&D heads).  We document each 
component of pay: salary, bonus, and long-term compensation.  The pay tied to long-term 
components includes restricted stock, stock options, and other components of long-term 
compensation as calculated by Hewitt Associates.
12  We also report the ratio of bonus to 
cash compensation (or salary plus bonus) and the ratio of long-term compensation to cash 
compensation.  We focus on long-term compensation because decisions made by 
corporate R&D heads have a longer-time horizon relative to decisions made by other 
                                                 
11An additional complication is introduced by the fact that few patents garner a significant number of 
citations in their first year of issue. When employing citation analyses, we explore the robustness to only 
employing patents that have had at least two years to be cited: for instance, we repeat Table 4, only 
employing compensation data between 1988 and 1995 in the citation regressions. The results are little 
changed. 
12These measures represent ex ante assessments of the value of long-term compensation and are computed 
by Hewitt Associates.  Stock options are valued using a modified version of Black-Scholes that takes into 
account firm-specific vesting and termination provisions in addition to the standard variables of interest 
rates, stock price volatility, and dividends.  As is standard practice among compensation consulting firms, 
the other components of long-term incentives (i.e., restricted stock, performance units, and performance 
shares) are valued using an economic valuation similar to Black-Scholes that takes into account firm-
specific vesting, term provisions, and the probability of achieving performance goals.     17 
executives, e.g., those responsible for manufacturing, marketing and sales.  And, payoffs 
associated with investing in innovation are not likely to be realized immediately. 
We analyze both cash compensation (salary and bonus) and total compensation.  
We also analyze several measures of performance-based pay as proxies for the incentives 
of corporate R&D heads. The first measure is the ratio of the value of long-term 
compensation to cash compensation. This measure is similar to that used in Holthausen, 
Larcker, and Sloan [1995].
13  We also analyze two distinct measures of long-term 
compensation: the ratio of the value of stock options to cash compensation and the ratio 
of restricted stock to cash compensation. Finally, as a measure of short-term incentives, 
we analyze the fraction of cash compensation from annual bonuses. 
In Panel A of Table 2, we report summary statistics of several pay measures for 
the corporate R&D head, the CEO, the CFO, and the HRH position. Compensation 
variables are denominated in 1996 dollars.  Sample averages for the corporate R&D head 
for salary and bonus (or cash compensation), ratio of bonus to cash compensation (ST 
incentive ratio), ratio of long-term compensation to cash compensation (LT incentive 
ratio), and total compensation are $380,039, 27.7%, 59.2%, and $641,559, respectively. 
Comparable sample averages for the CEO are $1,390,899, 35.7%, 98.9%, and $2,994,476 
respectively.  Finally, sample averages for the CFO are $538,340, 30.5%, 78.9%, and 
$1,011,812, and for the HRH are $339,366, 27.2%, 58.5% and $567,935, respectively.  
Consistent with the findings of the CEO literature, long-term compensation comprises a 
much greater proportion of CEO pay relative to corporate R&D, CFO, and HRH 
                                                 
13 Since we only observe flow compensation and not stock of incentives, we may worry about measurement 
error in our pay variables as proxies for performance-based incentives (Baker and Hall [2004]; Core and 
Guay [2002]). To partially address this issue, we also estimate between regressions by averaging executive 
observations over the period and analyzing variation between corporate R&D heads.     18 
positions. The long-term incentive ratio for the CEO, on average, is more than 50% 
greater than that for the corporate R&D head and HRH positions and 25% greater than 
that for the CFO position.
14   
In Panel B of Table 2, we document changes in cash compensation and both the 
fraction of bonus and the fraction of long-term compensation of salary plus bonus for the 
corporate R&D heads, the CEO, the CFO and the HRH position over the period of study. 
The table includes firms that appear in the dataset for two consecutive years.  By focusing 
on this set of observations, we minimize biases from the exit and entry of firms.  As we 
see, there is an upward trend in both annual and long-term compensation as a fraction of 
cash compensation for all four positions over time for this sample.  Also, the increase in 
the ratio of long-term compensation is much greater than that of the ratio of annual bonus 
and the increase in the former is much greater for the CEO relative to the other positions, 
especially the corporate R&D head and HRH positions.  (The patterns for the whole 
sample are qualitatively similar.)  
The ratio of long-term compensation to cash compensation is one measure of 
performance-based pay that might be particularly important in the effect it has on the 
corporate R&D head’s decisions to invest in innovation.  It is also an ex ante measure in 
that its value is based on expectations of future performance.  And, as mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
14This “flow” measure of long-term compensation understates incentive pay for the CEO relative to other 
executives because CEOs hold a much higher percentage of a firm’s stock in comparison to other 
managers.  Recent research on CEO compensation accounts for the incentives from the holding of stock 
and stock options (in addition to annual grants of restricted stock and options).  In contrast to ExecuComp 
data, we only observe annual grants of options and restricted stock and not stock holdings. In order for us to 
construct an explicit measure of incentives for an executive based on stock ownership from annual grants 
of options and restricted stock, we would have to make many assumptions about initial holdings, exercising 
of options, and vesting restrictions on both options and restricted stock. However, this data limitation is less 
problematic in our context because of the panel structure of our data and our econometric specification.  
Since we are exploiting both within firm and between firm variations in our random effects regressions, 
annual grants of options and restricted stock are an appropriate measure.     19 
the ratio of the value of long-term incentives to cash compensation for corporate R&D 
heads has more than doubled over the period from 1988 to 1998. 
One important consideration is that while all firms in the sample have a head of 
corporate research, not all of them have a centralized R&D organization. Approximately 
37% of the firm-year observations in our sample also have divisional R&D managers 
who typically report to division heads and are responsible for applied R&D and design 
and development engineering for the division.  In firms with a centralized R&D 
organization, corporate R&D heads have greater firm-wide authority over R&D since 
these firms do not have divisional R&D managers. Argyres and Silverman [2004] argue 
that there are fundamental differences between the manner in which firms with 
centralized versus decentralized research structures evaluate new projects. In addition, 
centralized R&D organizations generate innovations that have a higher level of impact 
and affect a broader range of technological areas than do firms with decentralized R&D 
organizations. 
It might be anticipated that offering high-powered incentives to the corporate 
R&D head would have a much more dramatic impact among firms that have a centralized 
R&D organization than in ones which also have divisional R&D managers. The ability of 
the corporate R&D head to have an effect on firm value is likely to be much lower in the 
case where R&D responsibilities reside in large part within the divisions.  
In Table 3, we report summary statistics of firm characteristics, pay measures for 
corporate R&D head and CEO positions, and innovation measures for both the samples 
with centralized R&D organizations and those with decentralized organizations.  The 
centralized R&D firms are smaller firms operating in more volatile environments.  These   20 
firms tend to have lower levels of compensation and lower ratios of performance-based 
pay for the CEO and the corporate R&D head positions.   
 
3.  Econometric Specification and Results 
3.1   Specification 
In each table of regressions, we use firm-years as units of observation. We 
estimate regressions with the same nine measures of innovation as dependent variables 
introduced above.
15 We typically employ a random effects specification. In these 
analyses, as well as the subsequent ones, we employ controls for each corporate R&D 
head separately.
16 While unobserved executive heterogeneity is a concern, we are limited 
to random effects specifications.  The fixed effects coefficients are imprecisely estimated, 
because there is not enough variation within R&D head compensation variables during 
the relatively short average tenure of each head.  
In each case, we employ as independent variables the logarithm of firm sales 
(denominated in 1996 dollars), the research intensity (the ratio of the firms’ R&D to 
sales), and dummy variables for the year of the observation. (Again, we explore the 
robustness of the results to additional control variables below.)  
As mentioned earlier, we might worry about measurement error in our use of flow 
compensation as a proxy for incentives since we are limited to annual grants of stock 
options and restricted stock. To address this, we examine the robustness of the results in a 
                                                 
15Due to the skewed distributions of the number of patents and publications (as documented in Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg [2002], we employ the logarithm of (one plus) these measures as dependent variables. The 
results are also robust to the use of a negative binomial specification based on the count of patents and 
publications.  
16We determine turnover of the corporate R&D head from the Hewitt data. In an alternative specification, 
we employ effects for each firm.  We find that while the explanatory power is not quite as high, the results 
are qualitatively unchanged.    21 
between regression that takes averages of observations over time periods for each 
corporate R&D head and analyzes variation between these positions.  
In most tables, we report four sets of analyses. In these analyses, we vary the 
dependent variable measuring compensation. In particular, we employ: 
·  The overall compensation level of the corporate R&D head, where we use the 
logarithm of compensation in 1996 dollars as the dependent variable.
17 
·  The ratio of long-term compensation of the corporate R&D head to the sum of 
the base compensation and bonus in that year. 
·  The ratio of long-term compensation of the corporate R&D head to the sum of 
base compensation and bonus in that year, as well as the ratio of short-run 
incentives (the ratio of bonus to the sum of base salary and bonus). 
·  The ratio of the two key components of long-term compensation of the 
corporate R&D head (stock options and restricted stock) to the sum of base 
compensation and bonus in that year. 
 
3.2  Baseline Results 
Table 4 presents the base-line analyses for the firms with centralized R&D 
organizations. Here, we see several distinct patterns: 
·  Higher compensation levels for the corporate R&D head are associated with 
more patent awards, more heavily cited patents, and more concentrated 
patents (Table 4a).  A one-standard deviation increase in the log of total 
compensation is associated with an increase of 0.65 in mean citations for the 
                                                 
17Salary increases are another measure that partially captures promotion incentives.  However, they are 
small relative to the importance of other types of incentives for corporate R&D heads.  The results are 
robust to the inclusion of the log of changes in salary for each manager in our regressions.   22 
firm, which is 14.3 % of the sample mean.  Or, an increase in total 
compensation from the 25
th percentile ($344,400) to the 75
th percentile 
($764,309) is associated with an increase of 0.8 in mean citations for the firm, 
which is 18.6 % of the sample mean.   
·  Long-term incentives for the corporate R&D head are associated with more 
patent awards, more heavily cited patents, and patents with greater generality 
(Table 4b). A one-standard deviation increase in the ratio of long-term 
incentives to salary plus bonus is associated with an increase of 9.0% in patent 
awards to the firm.  A one-standard deviation increase in the ratio of long-
term incentives to salary plus bonus is associated with an increase of 0.48 in 
mean citations for the firm, which is 10.4 % of the sample mean. An increase 
in the ratio of long-term incentives to salary plus bonus from the 25
th 
percentile (28.6%) to the 75
th percentile (74.3%) is associated with an increase 
of  0.41 in mean citations for the firm, which is 9.1% of the sample mean.   
·  Short-term incentives appear to have little impact, with the exception of the 
median number of adjusted citations (Table 4c). 
·  The long-term incentive effect appears to work through both stock options and 
restricted stock.  Restricted stock grants have the strongest relationship with 
citations, while options are associated with more patent awards (Table 4d). A 
one-standard deviation increase in the ratio of the value of restricted stock to 
salary plus bonus is associated with an increase of 0.47 in mean citations for 
the firm, which is 10.4 % of the sample mean.  For stock options, the 
associated increase is 8.0 % of the sample mean. An increase in the ratio of   23 
the value of stock options to salary plus bonus from the 25
th percentile 
(15.6%) to the 75
th percentile (52.1%) is associated with an increase of 0.27 in 
mean citations for the firm, which is 5.9% of the sample mean.   
·  Turning to the control variables, larger firms appear to patent more frequently 
and widely (i.e., the Herfindahl Index of patent classes is lower), and to have 
fewer citations, as well as to publish more.  More research-intensive firms 
publish more.
18 
These results appear to be more consistent with the Jensen hypothesis: high-
powered incentives are associated with more research output and higher research quality. 
There seem to be few of the anticipated costs associated with higher-powered incentives: 
these firms do not increase the concentration of their patent portfolio or reduce the 
number of publications.    
When we look at the firms with a decentralized R&D organization in Table 5, the 
results are much weaker. In Table 5a, the only significant patterns are that firms with 
higher compensation levels for the corporate R&D head patent more. In Table 5b, there is 
no significant relationship between long-term incentives and innovation. When we repeat 
the analyses in Tables 4c and 4d in unreported analyses, few significant patterns emerge.  
Moreover, these results are not robust to slight changes in the specification. For 
instance, when we repeat the analyses in Tables 4 and 5 with some slight changes, such 
as using random effects for each firm (rather than for each R&D manager) and 
winsorizing the compensation measures at the 99% level, the basic patterns in Table 4 
remain, while the few significant results in Table 5 disappear.     
                                                 
18 When we exclude R&D intensity from the baseline regressions in Table 4b, the magnitude of the 
coefficients are somewhat larger with no change in significance levels.   24 
To sum up, we find positive relations between innovation measures and long-term 
incentives for corporate R&D heads in the centralized R&D sample, but not in the sample 
of firms with a decentralized R&D organization.  
 
3.3. Robustness Checks 
We undertake a variety of robustness checks of the results. Table 6 is an example 
of the additional analyses we perform. 
In this table, we employ applications rather than awards, though as discussed 
above, the use of this measure may pose some concerns about truncation biases. The 
basic patterns go through as before. Higher compensation is associated more patenting, 
more citations, and now more focused awards.  More long-term incentives are associated 
with more patenting, more citations, and more general awards. The results continue to 
hold when we control for short-term compensation. Interestingly, more short-term 
incentives are associated with more focused awards.  When we divide the long-term 
compensation into stock options and restricted stock, both stock options and restricted 
stock have a statistically significant effect on the number of citations.  
In Table 7a, we undertake an analysis addressing the possibility that the above 
results may be driven by differences in the position of the corporate R&D head in the 
organizational hierarchy.  It might be that more incentive-based compensation is offered 
to positions closer to the CEO, which in turn drives the nature of the innovation.  Thus, 
we might be falsely imputing significance to the compensation variables, when it is really 
the hierarchical position that is critical.   25 
We are already partially addressing this issue by employing random effects in the 
regressions.  A wealth of sociological literature (e.g., Baron, Hannon, and Burton [1999]) 
has suggested that organizational features are very persistent, and typically survive even 
as the management team turns over.  Thus, these effects should absorb much of the 
differences. 
Another way to address this concern is to explicitly control for position within the 
hierarchy. In particular, it might be argued that during this period, the decision-making 
authority of the corporate R&D head’s position was considerably augmented. Put in the 
language of economic theory, R&D chiefs may have moved from having “formal” to 
“real” authority over the allocation of R&D budgets (Aghion and Tirole [1997], Dessein 
[2002]).  
To control for this possibility, we examine whether the head of corporate R&D 
reports directly to the CEO. We add a dummy variable for such observations, as well as 
an interaction between the compensation measures and the dummy. Table 7a shows that 
these controls make little difference to the results. 
We also undertake a variety of unreported robustness checks. As noted above, we 
winsorize the compensation measures, to delineate the effects of outliers.  We estimate 
ordinary least squares regressions merely employing dummy variables for each industry, 
but without fixed or random effects. In addition, we include the mean compensation of a 
number of other staff positions as a control.  We also vary the period that we lag the 
patent awards: that is, we look at the results if we assume the awards are issued one and 
three years after the application date. Also, we estimate the patent and publication   26 
regressions using a negative binomial specification that recognizes the dependent variable 
as a count measure.  In each case, the same basic patterns appear. 
Since there appears to be limited variation across time periods within firms, we 
repeat the specification in Table 4, but estimate between regressions.  In this analysis, we 
take averages of the observations over time for each executive, which allows us to limit 
the errors-in-variables problems brought about by annual fluctuations of the independent 
variables. We find similar qualitative patterns as in the random effects specifications, but 
with larger coefficients and greater statistical significance.
19 
 
3.4. Examining the Incentives Hypothesis 
We have been circumspect in the interpretation of these results. The positive 
association between innovation measures and long-term incentives of corporate R&D 
heads is consistent with the hypothesis that equity-based incentives lead to better 
decisions about project selection at the corporate level. However, alternative explanations 
certainly exist, such as the possibility that these incentives are offered to attract or retain 
high-quality managers or that these awards are a reward for past successful 
performance.
20 Definitively establishing one hypothesis is very challenging and beyond 
the scope of this paper.  However, we do explore evidence in light of the incentives 
hypothesis.  
                                                 
19When we undertake instrumental variable analyses using the between specification, we also do not see to 
the same extent the dramatic increase in the coefficients as we do in the random effects specifications 
discussed in Section 3.4.  
20Based on interviews with Hewitt Associates and human resource personnel, awarding stock options and 
restricted stock for past performance is relatively uncommon.  This is consistent with the finding of Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh [2000] that patents are infrequently used to measure internal performance.  Moreover, if 
stock options and restricted stock are granted as rewards for past performance, we might expect a positive 
contemporaneous relation between grants and pay.  To evaluate this, we estimate our baseline regression in 
Table 4b, but use contemporaneous measures of grants instead of lagged grants.  We find that the 
coefficient on long-term incentive pay is no longer significant in the citation regressions.   27 
We address this concern in three ways. First, we repeat the analysis of Table 4, 
but replace compensation of the corporate R&D head with compensation of two senior 
staff positions: Chief Financial Officer and Human Resources Head.  In effect, we are 
using these other positions as a control group. If our results are just spurious correlations 
driven by unobserved firm heterogeneity, then we might expect to find similar results for 
other senior staff positions.  In Tables 7b and 7c, we report the regressions analogous to 
Table 4b for the CFO and HRH positions based on the centralized R&D sample: that is, 
we regress the innovation measure on the ratio of long-term incentives to salary plus 
bonus, firm size, ratio of R&D to sales, firm and year indicators. While (the logarithm of) 
patents are weakly positively correlated with long-term incentives for the CFO position, 
there is no association for the HRH position, plus no association between the citation 
measures and long-term incentives for either of these positions.  When we estimate the 
patent count regressions based on a negative binomial specification, the weakly 
significant result between patents and long-term incentives for the CFO disappears.   
Importantly, the uniqueness of the positive associations between long-term 
incentives and citations for the corporate R&D head are consistent with the explanation 
that incentives affect decisions of managers responsible for corporate R&D. Both the 
CFO and the HRH position receive roughly comparable levels of long-term incentives as 
the corporate R&D head (see Table 2, Panel A), but it is only the R&D head incentives 
that are related to either patents or citations.  These results are also consistent with the 
explanation that greater performance pay attracts more skilled R&D managers. 
Second, since compensation is a choice variable and endogenously chosen, we 
undertake an instrumental variables analysis. An ideal instrument is one that is correlated   28 
with the independent variable of interest but not with the unobserved error in the 
dependent variable. For an instrument, we use the extent of spawning: the number of 
instances where an employee left a publicly traded firm headquartered in that county in 
that year to begin a venture-backed firm.  
The extent of spawning is likely to be correlated with incentive compensation. In 
many cases, these individuals obtained substantial equity stakes and/or stock option 
grants in the new ventures. It can be anticipated that these defections will create pressures 
for local firms to offer higher-powered compensation. Meanwhile, this variable should be 
uncorrelated with circumstances affecting the extent of innovation in the firm itself: in 
calculating this measure, we exclude spawning by both the Hewitt firm and by firms in 
the same two-digit industry within the same county as the Hewitt firm. Because by 
construction the spawned enterprises are in other industries than the Hewitt firm, it is 
unlikely that the rate of spawning is closely linked to the overall technological 
opportunity set facing the firm. We obtain this information from Gompers, et al. [2005], 
who compile this information from the DowJones Venture Source data-set.   
Table 8 presents the second-stage results of our instrumental variables regression. 
The number of citations continues to be explained by the instrumented long-term 
compensation ratio. Two results, however, are less easily explained. First, the mean 
originality of the patents actually declines with higher-powered incentives. Second, the 
magnitude of the coefficients increases quite dramatically in the instrumented 
regressions.   
Third, since agency theory predicts a negative relation between risk and 
incentives, if performance-based pay is offered to provide incentives, we should expect to   29 
see the sensitivity of pay to performance declining as the volatility of the performance 
measure rises.  To test this for the corporate R&D heads in our sample of firms, we 
replicate the analysis of Aggarwal and Samwick [1999] using total compensation, 
shareholder returns as the performance measure, and the empirical cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior 60 
months as the measure of risk.  We use standard deviations based on historical stock 
returns in order to somewhat mitigate the manager’s ability to influence stock return 
volatility. Based on the “implicit” method, we estimate a regression of total compensation 
for the corporate R&D head on stock returns, the CDF of return standard deviation, an 
interaction term between stock returns and the CDF, and firm and year indicators.  Total 
compensation is defined as salary, bonus, and the value of long-term incentives.  In Table 
9, we use two measures of shareholder returns and report the estimated coefficients on 
the performance measure, the interaction term between performance and risk, and the risk 
measure.  We first estimate the coefficients for the whole sample and then split the 
sample using two criteria: (i) firms with centralized versus decentralized R&D 
organizations; and (ii) firms above the sample median in the ratio of R&D to sales and 
firms below the median.   
Based on the whole sample and for both shareholder return measures, we find a 
negative risk-incentive relation, i.e., the coefficient on the performance measure is 
positive and significant, while that on the interaction between performance and risk is 
negative and significant.
21 The sensitivity of pay is positively related to performance and 
declines in the volatility of the performance measure.  These findings are consistent with 
offering stock-based pay to provide incentives.  Furthermore, we find that this relation 
                                                 
21These results are robust to inclusion of firm size measured as log of firm sales.    30 
holds in the partition of firms with centralized R&D organizations and R&D-intensive 
firms, but not in firms with decentralized R&D organizations or low R&D firms.  These 
results are consistent with the explanation that stock-based pay is more effective when 
the decisions of the corporate R&D head have the greatest effect on stock returns: that is, 
in R&D-intensive firms with centralized R&D organizations.  It is also consistent with 
Prendergast [2002], who argues that the mixed empirical results on the negative tradeoff 
between risk and incentives are due to the omission of measures of authority. When we 
partition the sample by characteristics that proxy for the importance of the corporate 
R&D head’s decision-making authority (centralized R&D and R&D-intensive firms), we 
find stronger support of the negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.  
Taken together, our findings suggest that incentives play some role in corporate 
R&D heads making better decisions over project selection. Once again, we cannot 
determine whether the effect is due to better project selection or better people selection.  
However, both explanations are consistent with performance pay:  firms should hire more 
skilled managers to produce more patents and pay them more in return.   
 
4. Conclusions 
Beginning in the late 1980s, American corporations began linking the 
compensation of central research personnel to the economic objectives of the corporation. 
This trend has attracted considerable concern in technology policy circles, while 
economic theory suggests widely different consequences. 
This paper examines the relationship between innovation and the shifting 
compensation of corporate R&D heads over the 1990s.  Among firms with centralized   31 
R&D organizations, a clear relationship emerges: more long-term incentives are 
associated with more heavily cited patents. These incentives also appear to be more 
weakly associated with more frequent awards and patents of greater generality. We 
undertake a variety of analyses to address concerns that the results reflect dynamics other 
than performance pay improving project selection by, or skill selection of, corporate 
R&D heads. Furthermore, the results appear to be robust to many of the controls we 
employ. 
Two important limitations of this analysis—and opportunities for future work—
should be noted. We confine our analysis here to the relationship between innovation and 
the shifting compensation on the head of corporate R&D.  It would certainly be 
interesting to examine the compensation schemes of divisional research managers as 
well. We intend to examine this question in future work.  
At the same time, the Hewitt data does not enable us to examine what are 
arguably the most interesting compensation choices: the incentives offered rank-and-file 
scientists and engineers. Field-based evidence suggests that the compensation has 
traditionally been extremely flat (Orth, Bailey, and Wolek [1964], Neumayer [1973]). 
Understanding the extent to which this pattern still holds, and its implications for 
innovation, is an important challenge. 
Second, it is by no means clear that our measures can capture shifts in truly 
groundbreaking research. It may be that profound changes in corporate research have 
occurred, but that the consequences of these shifts can only be measured after several 
decades. Nonetheless, the absence of deleterious patterns using the measures that we can 
employ is striking.    32 
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Note:  Sample includes firms that report both a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey and R&D expenditures in Compustat.  
Volatility of Shareholder Returns is defined as the standard deviation of monthly returns (percentage) based on the previous 60 
months. Patent count is defined as the sum of the number of patents awarded in that firm-year. Citations are defined as the mean and 
median of the number of citations in patents awarded in that firm-year.  Adjusted citations is defined as the mean and median of the 
number of adjusted citations per firm-year, where the adjustment entails subtracting the mean number of patents received by awards in 
that technology class in the same award year. Generality is a measure of the breadth of patents that cite the firm’s patents in a given 
year; originality the breadth of cited patents. Patent Herfindahl (HHI) is an index of the number of patent classes into which the firm’s 
patents fall.  Publications are defined as the number of publications by affiliates of that company included in the ISI Web of Science. 
Centralized R&D organization is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports a corporate R&D head, but no divisional R&D 
managers in a firm-year, and zero otherwise.  Direct Report to CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the corporate R&D head 
reports directly to the CEO in the organizational hierarchy.
Table 1 (Panel A):  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
           
Firm Sales ($ millions)  11038  21307  86  165370  818 
Assets  ($ millions)  12142  29465  103  279097  818 
R&D/Sales ratio  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.49  818 
Volatility of Shareholder Returns  8.71  3.53  3.62  50.55  762 
Patent Count  82.15  168.09  0.00  1936.00  735 
Citations (mean)  4.58  4.48  0.00  29.00  735 
Citations (median)  3.11  3.44  0.00  29.00  735 
Adjusted Citations (mean)  0.56  2.99  -4.85  21.39  735 
Adjusted Citations (median)  -0.74  2.33  -5.49  21.39  735 
Generality (mean)  0.28  0.16  0.00  0.86  702 
Originality (mean)  0.42  0.13  0.00  0.74  735 
Firm Herfindahl of Patents (HHI)   0.28  0.20  0.00  1.00  735 
Publications  112.67  323.41  0.00  2651.00  779 
Centralized R&D organization  0.63  0.48  0.00  1.00  818 
Direct Report to CEO (corporate R&D head)  0.48  0.50  0.00  1.00  813 

























Note:  Sample includes firms that report both a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey 
and R&D expenditures in Compustat.  
Table 1 (Panel B):  Industries of Firms in Sample 






% of Sample 
     
Chemical (28)  167  20.4 
Machinery (35)  120  14.7 
Transportation Equipment (37)  109  13.3 
Paper (26)  66  8.1 
Electrical (36)  57  7.0 
Instrumentation (38)  56  6.8 
Food (20)  52  6.4 
Communications (48)  25  3.1 
Other   166  20.3 
     
Total  818  100   38 
 
 
Table 1 (Panel C):  Ten Most Frequent Titles for 
Corporate R&D Head in Sample 
Rank                                  Title 
 
   
1       Vice President- Research and Development 
2       Vice President- Technology 
3       Vice President- Engineering 
4       Senior Vice President- Technology 
5       Senior Vice President- Research and Development 
6       Director- Research and Development 
7       Vice President- Science and Technology 
8       Executive Vice President- Research and Development 
9       Vice President- Research 
10       Vice President – Corporate Technology 



































Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey and R&D expenditures in Compustat. Compensation variables are 
denominated in 1996 dollars.  The value of long-term compensation is computed by Hewitt Associates.  Stock options are valued using a modified version of 
Black-Scholes that takes into account vesting and termination provisions in addition to the standard variables of interest rates, stock price volatility, and 
dividends.  As is standard practice among compensation consulting firms, the other components of long-term incentives (i.e., restricted stock, performance units 
and performance shares) are valued using an economic valuation similar to Black-Scholes that takes into account vesting, term provisions, and the probability of 
achieving performance goals.   
Table 2 (Panel A):  Summary Statistics 
Compensation of Corporate R&D Head, CEO, CFO, and Human Resources Head Positions 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max  Obs 
           
Corporate R&D Head           
  Salary+Bonus (constant 1996 $)  380039  204768  99952  1969598  817 
  ST incentive ratio (Bonus/(Salary+Bonus))  0.277  0.142  0.000  0.750  817 
  LT incentive ratio (Long-Term Incentive/(Salary+Bonus))  0.592  0.521  0.000  5.034  817 
  Total Compensation (constant 1996 $)  641559  502934  99952  5267421  817 
           
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)           
  Salary+Bonus (constant 1996 $)  1390899  904192  361536  11100000  786 
  ST incentive ratio (Bonus/(Salary+Bonus))  0.357  0.182  0.000  0.870  786 
  LT incentive ratio (Long-Term Incentive/(Salary+Bonus))  0.989  0.911  0.000  11.027  786 
  Total Compensation (constant 1996 $)  2994476  3113832  364478  35600000  786 
           
Chief Financial Officer  (CFO)           
  Salary+Bonus (constant 1996 $)  538340  290377  156142  3778934  674 
  ST incentive ratio (Bonus/(Salary+Bonus))  0.305  0.158  0.000  0.795  674 
  LT incentive ratio (Long-Term Incentive/(Salary+Bonus))  0.789  0.622  0.000  5.547  674 
  Total Compensation (constant 1996 $)  1011812  778089  173897  8378033  674 
 
Human Resources Head (HRH)           
  Salary+Bonus (constant 1996 $)  339366  162991  99698  1535105  722 
  ST incentive ratio (Bonus/(Salary+Bonus))  0.272  0.141  0.000  0.703  722 
  LT incentive ratio (Long-Term Incentive/(Salary+Bonus))  0.585  0.474  0.000  4.257  722 
  Total Compensation (constant 1996 $)  567935  405922  103922  3932550  722 





Note:  Sample includes firms that report both a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey for two consecutive years and R&D expenditures in Compustat. 
Compensation variables are denominated in 1996 dollars.  The value of long-term compensation is computed by Hewitt Associates.  Stock options are valued 
using a modified version of Black-Scholes that takes into account vesting and termination provisions in addition to the standard variables of interest rates, stock 
price volatility, and dividends.  As is standard practice among compensation consulting firms, the other components of long-term incentives (i.e., restricted stock, 
performance units and performance shares) are valued using an economic valuation similar to Black-Scholes that takes into account vesting, term provisions, and 
the probability of achieving performance goals.  LT incentive ratio is the ratio of long-term incentives, such as restricted stock and option grants, to salary and 




Table 2 (Panel B): Trends in Compensation  
Corporate R&D Head, CEO, CFO and Human Resources Head Positions 
 
 






Human Resources Head 





































                           
1988  353661  0.387  0.278  1158623  0.637  0.341  510314  0.490  0.297  294477  0.355  0.270  50 
1989  355525  0.380  0.253  1215221  0.605  0.314  516050  0.518  0.286  289417  0.349  0.245  51 
1990  341902  0.455  0.222  1187175  0.738  0.296  483097  0.615  0.254  293616  0.423  0.226  56 
1991  344507  0.568  0.218  1128942  0.810  0.271  441818  0.700  0.224  294977  0.509  0.210  62 
1992  384016  0.524  0.262  1256524  0.848  0.319  485261  0.679  0.271  326281  0.501  0.246  66 
1993  353783  0.600  0.231  1267873  0.851  0.318  503907  0.710  0.258  317149  0.549  0.229  72 
1994  409573  0.610  0.321  1576426  0.911  0.416  581149  0.771  0.355  378858  0.550  0.316  62 
1995  438664  0.696  0.339  1741238  1.215  0.446  602749  0.860  0.367  423784  0.700  0.340  54 
1996  412076  0.822  0.307  1910300  1.517  0.422  638727  1.320  0.347  443626  1.040  0.334  52 
1997  430593  0.872  0.328  1908689  1.747  0.442  619821  1.260  0.356  429787  0.976  0.326  48 
1998  480092  0.868  0.345  2037057  1.677  0.444  726682  1.290  0.366  386705  0.800  0.305  39 




Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate 
standard deviations.  Volatility of Shareholder Returns is defined as the standard deviation of monthly returns (percentage) based on the previous 60 months.  The sample is split 
into firms with a centralized R&D function vs. firms with decentralized R&D (i.e. firms with both a corporate R&D function and divisional R&D managers). Options/ Cash and 
Restricted Stock/ Cash are the ratios of the value of stock option grants and restricted stock to salary plus bonus, respectively.  Patent Count is the number of patent awards. Mean 
and median of citations are based on citations through 1999 and are computed on a yearly basis. Adjusted citations control for the technology subclass, year of the award, and the 
location of the patentee. Original and generality are based on citation patterns (see text). HHI for firm is the Herfindahl Index of the firms’ patent filings in each year across 
technology subclasses. Publications are the number of publications in Web of Science. See earlier tables for other variable definitions.   
Table 3:  Summary Statistics--Sample Split by Organizational Structure of R&D—Centralized R&D vs. Decentralized R&D  
 
I.  Firm Variables--Sample Means and Medians 
  Sales  R&D/Sales  Volatility  Direct Report to CEO  Sales  R&D/Sales  Volatility  Direct Report 
to CEO 
  Mean  Median 
Centralized R&D   7556.07  0.044  9.02  0.42  3227.3  0.027  8.19  0 
Decentralized R&D  16945.44  0.049  8.20  0.58  6125.95  0.039  7.60  1 
 
II. Pay Measures—Sample Means and Median 






















a. Corporate R&D Head 
  Mean  Median 
Centralized R&D   608329.1  0.266  0.590  0.433  0.052  493691.1  0.286  0.469  0.305  0 
Decentralized R&D  697634.9  0.296  0.596  0.437  0.044  558679.5  0.305  0.479  0.324  0 
b. Chief Executive Officer 
  Mean  Median 
Centralized R&D   2647631  0.343  0.974  0.714  0.097  1933995  0.392  0.758  0.455  0 
Decentralized R&D  3117808  0.379  1.015  0.727  0.107  2161250  0.404  0.840  0.515  0 
 
III.  Innovation Measures—Sample Means 















HHI for Firm  Publications  Firm-Years 
(N) 
Centralized R&D   82.88  4.66  3.25  -0.69  0.60  0.28  0.42  0.30  94.43  513 
Decentralized R&D  81.14  4.44  2.86  -0.36  0.98  0.28  0.42  0.25  139.31  304   42 
 
Table 4a: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head (log) Total Compensation--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















Log (total comp.)  for Corp RD Head  0.249***  1.066**  0.999***  1.124***  1.060***  0.010  -0.015  0.045*  0.130 
  (0.089)  (0.437)  (0.374)  (0.386)  (0.309)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.094) 
Log (firm sales)  0.638***  -0.492*  -0.653***  -0.552***  -0.660***  -0.006  -0.000  -0.075***  0.843*** 
  (0.065)  (0.253)  (0.203)  (0.211)  (0.158)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.080) 
R&D/firm sales  8.047***  16.313***  5.275  6.825  -3.478  0.457***  0.125  -0.505**  12.235*** 
  (1.349)  (5.226)  (4.183)  (4.330)  (3.218)  (0.167)  (0.171)  (0.251)  (1.633) 
Constant  -5.714***  -1.963  -1.585  -8.882**  -9.027***  0.295  0.596***  0.320  -6.963*** 
  (1.069)  (5.006)  (4.235)  (4.380)  (3.464)  (0.181)  (0.175)  (0.269)  (1.163) 
Observations  457  457  457  457  457  433  457  457  486 
Number of Corp RD Heads  177  177  177  177  177  170  177  177  175 
 
Table 4b: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive Ratio--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
















HHI for Firm  Log 
(Publications) 
LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD Head  0.171**  0.908**  0.820**  0.773**  0.578**  0.030**  0.019  0.010  0.069 
  (0.076)  (0.390)  (0.340)  (0.353)  (0.293)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.079) 
Log (firm sales)  0.685***  -0.329  -0.499***  -0.361*  -0.455***  -0.008  -0.008  -0.064***  0.871*** 
  (0.061)  (0.227)  (0.181)  (0.191)  (0.143)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.076) 
R&D/firm sales  8.628***  18.593***  7.541*  9.608**  -0.482  0.428***  0.023  -0.341  12.499*** 
  (1.320)  (4.957)  (3.932)  (4.143)  (3.085)  (0.155)  (0.162)  (0.240)  (1.618) 
Constant  -2.988***  9.944***  9.590***  3.636**  2.673**  0.424***  0.454***  0.807***  -5.565*** 
  (0.515)  (1.942)  (1.551)  (1.632)  (1.230)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.096)  (0.644) 
Observations  457  457  457  457  457  433  457  457  486 
Number of Corp RD Heads  177  177  177  177  177  170  177  177  175 
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Table 4c: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive and ST Incentive Ratio--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD Head  0.172**  0.927**  0.853**  0.823**  0.661**  0.026*  0.016  0.012  0.077 
  (0.076)  (0.392)  (0.342)  (0.354)  (0.292)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.079) 
Bonus/(salary+bonus) for Corp RD Head  0.042  0.682  1.106  1.530  2.318***  -0.075*  -0.092**  0.061  0.246 
  (0.211)  (1.132)  (1.008)  (1.040)  (0.883)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.069)  (0.220) 
Log (firm sales)  0.683***  -0.356  -0.541***  -0.420**  -0.544***  -0.005  -0.004  -0.067***  0.862*** 
  (0.061)  (0.232)  (0.185)  (0.194)  (0.145)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.076) 
R&D/firm sales  8.625***  18.493***  7.351*  9.351**  -0.907  0.445***  0.039  -0.353  12.556*** 
  (1.322)  (4.971)  (3.940)  (4.143)  (3.052)  (0.156)  (0.161)  (0.239)  (1.615) 
Constant  -2.984***  9.975***  9.628***  3.688**  2.743**  0.420***  0.451***  0.809***  -5.556*** 
  (0.516)  (1.946)  (1.553)  (1.631)  (1.216)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.095)  (0.642) 
Observations  457  457  457  457  457  433  457  457  486 
Number of Corp RD Heads  177  177  177  177  177  170  177  177  175 
 
 
Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat, and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate standard 
deviations.  The sample is only those firms with a centralized R&D organization (i.e. firms with a corporate R&D head, but no division R&D managers). Log (Patent Count) and Log 
(Publications) are defined as the logarithm of (one plus) the number of patents and publications. All regressions include unreported year fixed effects.  ***/**/* represent significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level. See earlier tables/text for variable definitions.   
Table 4d: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Compensation Components (Stock Options & Restricted Stock)— 
Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















Options/ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD Head  0.182**  0.741*  0.722*  0.580  0.388  0.025  0.004  0.007  0.119 
  (0.085)  (0.437)  (0.382)  (0.395)  (0.328)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.088) 
Rest. Stock/ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD Head  -0.297  2.931***  2.386***  2.502***  1.793***  0.050  0.052  0.071  -0.371 
  (0.211)  (0.933)  (0.782)  (0.817)  (0.657)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.051)  (0.239) 
Log (firm sales)  0.687***  -0.245  -0.429**  -0.283  -0.391***  -0.006  -0.004  -0.063***  0.869*** 
  (0.061)  (0.223)  (0.177)  (0.187)  (0.139)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.075) 
R&D/firm sales  8.740***  18.041***  7.149*  9.298**  -0.473  0.430***  0.041  -0.354  12.595*** 
  (1.329)  (4.916)  (3.896)  (4.115)  (3.072)  (0.157)  (0.163)  (0.241)  (1.616) 
Constant  -2.982***  9.444***  9.159***  3.163**  2.273*  0.411***  0.436***  0.797***  -5.556*** 
  (0.517)  (1.917)  (1.529)  (1.612)  (1.216)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.095)  (0.641) 
Observations  456  456  456  456  456  432  456  456  485 
Number of Corp RD Heads  177  177  177  177  177  170  177  177  175   44 
 
 
Table 5a: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head (log) Total Compensation--Decentralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















Log (total comp.)  for Corp RD Head  0.276**  -0.202  -0.067  -0.109  0.147  -0.011  -0.000  0.029  -0.037 
  (0.118)  (0.469)  (0.324)  (0.417)  (0.251)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.145) 
Log (firm sales)  0.508***  -0.092  -0.000  -0.157  -0.116  -0.004  -0.005  -0.052***  0.905*** 
  (0.077)  (0.232)  (0.146)  (0.194)  (0.102)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.098) 
R&D/firm sales  4.888**  13.770**  4.465  3.401  -5.634*  0.432  -0.587**  -0.004  9.159*** 
  (2.084)  (6.663)  (4.231)  (5.603)  (3.043)  (0.263)  (0.274)  (0.372)  (2.606) 
Constant  -4.698***  10.686**  5.749  3.605  -2.476  0.551**  0.465**  0.299  -4.893*** 
  (1.379)  (5.214)  (3.564)  (4.600)  (2.756)  (0.215)  (0.206)  (0.315)  (1.664) 
Observations  277  277  277  277  277  268  277  277  292 
Number of Corp RD Heads  101  101  101  101  101  96  101  101  102 
 
Table 5b: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive Ratio--Decentralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD Head  0.070  0.005  0.116  -0.187  -0.136  0.004  -0.008  0.017  -0.010 
  (0.089)  (0.363)  (0.260)  (0.329)  (0.218)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.098) 
Log (firm sales)  0.580***  -0.146  -0.026  -0.172  -0.070  -0.007  -0.004  -0.046***  0.895*** 
  (0.070)  (0.197)  (0.119)  (0.160)  (0.080)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.088) 
R&D/firm sales  5.895***  12.768**  3.867  3.202  -4.559*  0.377  -0.577**  0.113  9.013*** 
  (2.054)  (6.281)  (3.904)  (5.191)  (2.722)  (0.248)  (0.261)  (0.343)  (2.553) 
Constant  -1.827***  8.587***  5.078***  2.411  -0.974  0.436***  0.459***  0.607***  -5.266*** 
  (0.644)  (1.833)  (1.127)  (1.502)  (0.782)  (0.072)  (0.077)  (0.099)  (0.804) 
Observations  277  277  277  277  277  268  277  277  292 
Number of Corp RD Heads  101  101  101  101  101  96  101  101  102 
 
Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat, and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate 
standard deviations.  The sample is only those firms with a decentralized R&D organization (i.e. firms with both a corporate R&D head and division R&D managers. Log (Patent 
Count) and Log (Publications) are defined as the logarithm of (one plus) the number of patents and publications. All regressions include unreported year fixed effects.  ***/**/* 
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Table 6a: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head (log) Total Compensation--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects)--Applications 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















Log (total comp.)  for Corp RD Head   0.372***  2.398***  1.969***  2.017***  1.719***  0.024  0.008  0.069***  0.110 
      (0.101)  (0.595)  (0.491)  (0.510)  (0.396)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.119) 
Log (firm sales)  0.660***  -0.672**  -0.863***  -0.614**  -0.780***  -0.017  -0.007  -0.089***  0.845*** 
  (0.067)  (0.297)  (0.241)  (0.249)  (0.190)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.090) 
R&D/firm sales  7.177***  14.907**  3.991  9.568*  -1.050  0.421**  -0.136  -0.787***  13.812*** 
  (1.446)  (5.979)  (4.869)  (5.046)  (3.883)  (0.207)  (0.173)  (0.279)  (1.966) 
Constant  -7.551***  -18.337***  -13.277**  -20.914***  -17.675***  0.191  0.386**  0.154  -6.869*** 
  (1.187)  (6.692)  (5.513)  (5.721)  (4.431)  (0.231)  (0.179)  (0.298)  (1.429) 
Observations  384  304  304  304  304  304  384  384  378 
Number of Corp RD Heads  160  139  139  139  139  139  160  160  154 
 
Table 6b: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive Ratio—Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects)--Applications 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for   0.181**  2.216***  1.714***  1.781***  1.142***  0.041**  0.010  -0.002  0.020 
    Corp RD Head  (0.090)  (0.576)  (0.484)  (0.505)  (0.409)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.100) 
Log (firm sales)  0.740***  -0.320  -0.558***  -0.303  -0.455***  -0.016*  -0.006  -0.069***  0.875*** 
  (0.062)  (0.262)  (0.212)  (0.222)  (0.171)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.084) 
R&D/firm sales  8.390***  19.826***  8.348*  13.841***  3.644  0.427**  -0.124  -0.490*  14.200*** 
  (1.395)  (5.608)  (4.562)  (4.773)  (3.729)  (0.192)  (0.163)  (0.268)  (1.922) 
Constant  -3.537***  8.632***  8.816***  1.711  1.297  0.475***  0.481***  0.874***  -5.720*** 
  (0.529)  (2.235)  (1.810)  (1.894)  (1.468)  (0.076)  (0.064)  (0.105)  (0.716) 
Observations  384  304  304  304  304  304  384  384  378 
Number of Corp RD Heads  160  139  139  139  139  139  160  160  154   46 
 
Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat, and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate 
standard deviations.  The sample is only those firms with a centralized R&D organization (i.e. firms with a corporate R&D head, but no division R&D managers). Log (Patent Count) 
and Log (Publications) are defined as the logarithm of (one plus) the number of patents and publications. All regressions include unreported year fixed effects.  ***/**/* represent 





Table 6c: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive and ST Incentive Ratio--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects)--Applications 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for   0.204**  2.300***  1.810***  1.851***  1.252***  0.040**  0.011  0.010  0.041 
     Corp RD Head  (0.091)  (0.582)  (0.487)  (0.510)  (0.408)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.101) 
Bonus/(salary+bonus) for   0.389*  1.822  2.255  1.583  2.811**  -0.020  0.016  0.268***  0.318 
    Corp RD Head  (0.226)  (1.627)  (1.397)  (1.461)  (1.202)  (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.072)  (0.246) 
Log (firm sales)  0.721***  -0.387  -0.640***  -0.361  -0.560***  -0.015  -0.006  -0.080***  0.860*** 
  (0.063)  (0.270)  (0.218)  (0.229)  (0.174)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.085) 
R&D/firm sales  8.341***  19.336***  7.798*  13.446***  3.025  0.432**  -0.127  -0.543**  14.231*** 
  (1.396)  (5.640)  (4.572)  (4.792)  (3.700)  (0.192)  (0.164)  (0.265)  (1.917) 
Constant  -3.501***  8.655***  8.839***  1.733  1.360  0.475***  0.481***  0.887***  -5.694*** 
  (0.529)  (2.243)  (1.810)  (1.897)  (1.452)  (0.076)  (0.064)  (0.104)  (0.715) 
Observations  384  304  304  304  304  304  384  384  378 
Number of Corp RD Heads  160  139  139  139  139  139  160  160  154 
Table 6d: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Compensation Components (Stock Options and Restricted Stock) -- 
Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects)--Applications 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















Options/ (salary+bonus) for   0.192*  1.909***  1.533***  1.570***  1.092**  0.032  -0.013  0.010  0.046 
    Corp RD Head  (0.101)  (0.677)  (0.565)  (0.593)  (0.476)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.111) 
Rest. Stock/ (salary+bonus) for   -0.274  3.158***  2.592***  2.371**  1.392*  0.051  0.048  -0.026  -0.352 
     Corp RD Head  (0.212)  (1.079)  (0.904)  (0.948)  (0.775)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.053)  (0.249) 
Log (firm sales)  0.743***  -0.196  -0.469**  -0.209  -0.407**  -0.013  -0.002  -0.071***  0.874*** 
  (0.062)  (0.260)  (0.209)  (0.221)  (0.170)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.084) 
R&D/firm sales  8.473***  19.844***  8.226*  13.810***  3.446  0.435**  -0.085  -0.512*  14.277*** 
  (1.405)  (5.647)  (4.579)  (4.822)  (3.770)  (0.194)  (0.166)  (0.270)  (1.918) 
Constant  -3.536***  7.977***  8.355***  1.218  1.064  0.462***  0.461***  0.885***  -5.719*** 
  (0.531)  (2.231)  (1.800)  (1.897)  (1.471)  (0.077)  (0.064)  (0.105)  (0.713) 
Observations  383  303  303  303  303  303  383  383  377 
No. of Corp RD Heads  160  139  139  139  139  139  160  160  154   47 
Table 7a: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive Ratio and Reporting Relationship to CEO 
Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















Direct Report to CEO  0.069  0.417  0.693  0.300  0.624  0.022  0.024  -0.006  -0.120 
  (0.096)  (0.502)  (0.447)  (0.459)  (0.393)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.097) 
LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD 
Head 
0.064  1.181**  1.050**  0.994*  0.805*  0.038  0.027  0.015  0.007 
  (0.110)  (0.587)  (0.527)  (0.540)  (0.469)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.036)  (0.105) 
LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for Corp RD 
Head*Direct Report to CEO 
0.170  -0.533  -0.523  -0.447  -0.497  -0.019  -0.017  -0.007  0.131 
  (0.137)  (0.707)  (0.627)  (0.644)  (0.550)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.043)  (0.122) 
Log (firm sales)  0.696***  -0.251  -0.445**  -0.299  -0.418***  -0.006  -0.007  -0.064***  0.870*** 
  (0.061)  (0.220)  (0.178)  (0.185)  (0.141)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.076) 
R&D/firm sales  8.540***  18.793***  7.411*  9.813**  -0.632  0.427***  0.011  -0.328  12.685*** 
  (1.315)  (4.801)  (3.880)  (4.019)  (3.068)  (0.155)  (0.162)  (0.243)  (1.611) 
Constant  -3.057***  9.041***  8.875***  2.923*  2.120*  0.402***  0.441***  0.808***  -5.502*** 
  (0.519)  (1.907)  (1.553)  (1.608)  (1.244)  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.098)  (0.647) 
Observations  455  455  455  455  455  431  455  455  483 










Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat, and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate 
standard deviations.  The sample is only those firms with a centralized R&D organization (i.e. firms with a corporate R&D head, but no division R&D managers). Direct Report to CEO is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the Corporate R&D Head reports directly to the CEO in the organizational hierarchy and zero otherwise. Log (Patent Count) and Log (Publications) 
are defined as the logarithm of (one plus) the number of patents and publications. All regressions include unreported year fixed effects.  ***/**/* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level. See earlier tables/text for other variable definitions.   
Table 7b: Firm Innovation Measures and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) LT Incentive Ratio--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Firm Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
















HHI for Firm  Log 
(Publications) 
LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for CFO  0.123*  -0.303  -0.262  -0.380  -0.344  -0.002  0.003  -0.005  -0.007 
  (0.065)  (0.312)  (0.274)  (0.294)  (0.255)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.064) 
Log (firm sales)  0.534***  -0.211  -0.309  -0.197  -0.255  -0.000  -0.011  -0.066***  0.892*** 
  (0.079)  (0.281)  (0.226)  (0.238)  (0.179)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.094) 
R&D/firm sales  8.639***  16.351***  7.514*  10.024**  1.321  0.423**  0.006  -0.287  12.010*** 
  (1.546)  (5.480)  (4.409)  (4.633)  (3.487)  (0.184)  (0.191)  (0.299)  (1.832) 
Constant  -1.782***  9.525***  8.251***  2.815  1.315  0.380***  0.488***  0.814***  -5.618*** 
  (0.661)  (2.379)  (1.922)  (2.022)  (1.530)  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.131)  (0.790) 
Observations  371  371  371  371  371  348  371  371  395 
Number of firms  105  105  105  105  105  101  105  105  101 
Table 7c: Firm Innovation Measures and Human Resources Head (HRH) LT Incentive Ratio--Centralized R&D Sample 
Random Effects Specification (Firm Random Effects) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
















HHI for Firm  Log 
(Publications) 
LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for HRH  0.029  -0.063  -0.059  -0.010  -0.063  -0.006  0.023  -0.007  0.065 
  (0.082)  (0.394)  (0.344)  (0.368)  (0.314)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.079) 
Log (firm sales)  0.602***  -0.629**  -0.621***  -0.541**  -0.524***  -0.008  -0.011  -0.059***  0.985*** 
  (0.074)  (0.267)  (0.216)  (0.224)  (0.172)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.087) 
R&D/firm sales  8.436***  15.082***  7.197  8.643*  0.529  0.442**  0.020  -0.138  11.420*** 
  (1.598)  (5.634)  (4.543)  (4.715)  (3.602)  (0.182)  (0.194)  (0.292)  (1.889) 
Constant  -2.209***  12.554***  10.739***  5.138***  3.325**  0.428***  0.469***  0.748***  -6.362*** 
  (0.620)  (2.247)  (1.822)  (1.895)  (1.457)  (0.074)  (0.077)  (0.118)  (0.730) 
Observations  408  408  408  408  408  387  408  408  437 





Table 8: Firm Innovation Measures and Corporate R&D Head LT Incentive Ratio--Centralized R&D Sample 
2SLS Random Effects Specification (Corp RD Head Random Effects) 
Instrument is number of spawned firms in county of headquarters per year excluding own firm and firms in own 2-digit industry 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 




















LT comp./ (salary+bonus) for   -0.198  6.825**  5.754**  3.500*  1.605  0.044  -0.295**  -0.157  0.076 
    Corp RD Head  (0.779)  (2.695)  (2.719)  (2.086)  (1.672)  (0.137)  (0.127)  (0.266)  (2.766) 
Log (firm sales)  0.763***  -1.135**  -1.250***  -0.713**  -0.628**  -0.011  0.031  -0.038  0.772* 
  (0.132)  (0.458)  (0.476)  (0.354)  (0.284)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.044)  (0.408) 
R&D/firm sales  15.843***  16.169**  2.083  8.605  -1.989  0.666**  0.784**  -0.219  10.325*** 
  (2.237)  (7.745)  (7.580)  (5.994)  (4.806)  (0.330)  (0.365)  (0.598)  (2.188) 
Constant  -3.685***  13.572***  13.189***  5.003**  3.306*  0.422***  0.240*  0.677***  -4.544** 
  (0.862)  (2.985)  (3.028)  (2.310)  (1.852)  (0.138)  (0.141)  (0.260)  (1.990) 
Observations  431  431  431  431  431  407  431  431  459 
Number of Corp RD Heads  164  164  164  164  164  157  164  164  161 
 
Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat, and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate 
standard deviations.  The sample is only those firms with a centralized R&D organization (i.e. firms with a corporate R&D head, but no division R&D managers). Log (Patent Count) 
and Log (Publications) are defined as the logarithm of (one plus) the number of patents and publications. All regressions include unreported year fixed effects.  ***/**/* represent 
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. See earlier tables/text for other variable definitions.     50 
 
Table 9: Pay-Performance Sensitivities Based on Measures of Total Compensation for Corporate R&D Head Positions 
Firm Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
    Sample Partition by R&D 
Organization 
Sample Partition by R&D 
Intensity 
  Whole Sample  Centralized R&D  Decentralized 
R&D 
High R&D  Low R&D 
           
Shareholder Returns excluding dividends           
           
Stock Return  2.488***  3.110***  1.352  2.778**  -2.099 
  (0.964)  (1.092)  (1.776)  (1.414)  (1.412) 
Stock Return*CDF of Std. Deviation  -2.489***  -3.148***  -0.499  -2.817**  6.374*** 
  (0.972)  (1.098)  (2.687)  (1.421)  (1.853) 
CDF of Std. Deviation  373.09***  523.47***  248.77  423.99***  -41.10*** 
  (108.33)  (140.60)  (157.89)  (162.00)  (152.56) 
           
Shareholder Returns including dividends           
           
Stock Return  2.825***  3.416***  3.214*  3.756***  -0.054 
  (1.122)  (1.299)  (1.925)  (1.620)  (1.666) 
Stock Return*CDF of Std. Deviation  -2.312*  -3.386**  -2.781  -3.807**  2.361 
  (1.385)  (1.542)  (2.910)  (1.898)  (2.348) 
CDF of Std.Deviation  392.58***  521.67***  160.88  548.42***  98.72 
  (112.54)  (139.46)  (173.71)  (169.62)  (149.95) 
 
Note:  Sample includes firms that report a corporate R&D head in the compensation survey, R&D expenditures in Compustat, and 60 months of historical stock returns to calculate 
standard deviations. Centralized R&D sub-sample includes firms that report corporate R&D heads, while decentralized R&D sub-sample includes firms that report both corporate 
R&D heads and division R&D managers.  High R&D sub-sample includes firms with ratio of R&D to sales above the sample median, while low R&D includes those below the 
sample median. The dependent variable is total flow compensation for the corporate R&D head: salary, bonus and the value of long-term incentives (including stock options, 
restricted stock, performance unit plans and performance share plans). Stock returns are measured as annual shareholder returns (excluding dividends) and annual total shareholder 
returns (average of monthly returns), both stated in percentage points.  CDF of Std. Deviation represents the empirical cumulative distribution function of the standard deviation of 
monthly % returns over prior 60 months.  Each regression includes firm and year indicators.  ***/**/* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.  See earlier tables/text for 
other variable definitions.   51 
Appendix A:  Survey Representativeness 
We evaluate the representativeness of Hewitt survey participants by comparing 
key financial measures of the survey participants to a matched sample from Compustat.  
We begin by matching each firm in the Hewitt dataset to the Compustat firm that is 
closest in sales within its two-digit SIC industry in the year the firm joins the sample.  We 
then perform Wilcoxon signed rank tests to compare the Hewitt firms with the matched 
firms. While the firms in the Hewitt dataset are, on average, slightly larger in sales than 
the matched sample, we found no statistically significant difference in employment and 
profitability (return on sales).
22  We also found no statistically significant difference in 
sales growth, employment growth, or annual changes in profitability for all sample years.  
In sum, while the Hewitt firms are larger (measured by sales) on average than the 
matched sample, there is little additional evidence that these firms are not representative 
of the population of industrial firms that are leaders in their sectors.   
We also calculate financial measures for the sample of Compustat firms with 
10,000 employees or greater over the period from 1987 to 1998 (excluding firms 
operating in financial services).  We find that, on average, survey participants are more 
profitable, but growing at a slower rate relative to the sample of large Compustat firms.  
Specifically, the sample average return on sales for survey participants is 17.8% versus 
15.7% for the sample of large Compustat firms and the average sales growth is 5.7% vs. 
7.4%.  This is consistent with the observation that the firms in the sample are likely to be 
industry leaders (hence slightly more profitable) and also large (hence the slightly slower 
                                                 
22The Hewitt firms are larger in sales than the matched sample of firms because in a number of the cases, 
the Hewitt firm is the largest firm in the industry thus forcing me to select a matched firm smaller in size.     52 
growth). To sum up, the survey sample is probably most representative of Fortune 500 
firms.       53 
Appendix B:  Position Descriptions from Hewitt Survey 
 
1.  Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The highest executive authority in the corporation.  
Reports to the Board of Directors.  May also be Chairman or President.  
 
Research and Development Positions: 
 
2.  Corporate Level Research and Development (Corporate R&D Head).  Responsible 
for applied research and development and design and development engineering for 
the entire corporation.  Oversees and directs R&D activities of the corporation 
leading to new or improved products or processes.  Provides technical assistance and, 
when necessary, correlates research activities with other functions and operating 
units. 
 
3.  Division Level Research and Development.  The head of all applied R&D and design 
and development engineering for the division.  Responsibilities include investigation 
and experimentation aimed at practical applications of scientific theories, as well as 
the application of existing engineering and scientific theories and techniques to the 
design and development of new products.   
 
4.  Principal Scientist.  Top R&D technical position, responsible for research leadership 
in creating or improving products or processes.  Originates and coordinates research 
projects, evaluates results, and makes recommendations to senior management.  This 
is the top position on the technical (non-managerial) career ladder within R&D and 
may be equivalent to the R&D Director in terms of level. 
 
Senior Staff Positions: 
 
5.  Human Resources Head (HRH). Head of all human resources with responsibility for 
establishing and implementing corporate-wide policies. 
 
6.  Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Functional head responsible for all financial 
operations of the corporation. Has responsibility for both the treasury and accounting 
functions. Indicate whether responsibilities also include data processing, investor 
relations, internal audit, and tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 